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NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: RESEARCH
ON THE FETUS
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER KAREN LEBACQZt WITH THE

CONCURRENCE OF COMMISSIONER ALBERT R. JONSENt
ON THE FIRST ITEM

The following comments include some points of dissent from the
Recommendations of the Commission. For the most part, however,
these comments are intended as elaborations on the Report rather than
dissent from it.
1. At several points, the Commission established as a criterion
for permissible research an acceptable level of risk - e.g., "no risk" or
"minimal risk." I support the Commission's Recommendations regarding such criteria, but I wish to make several interpretative comments.
First, I think it should be stressed that in the first trials on human
subjects or on a new class of human subjects, the risks are almost always
unknown. The Commission heard compelling evidence that differences
in physiology and pharmacology between human and other mammalian
fetuses are such that even with substantial trials in animal models it is
often not possible to assess the risks for the first trials with human
fetuses. For example, evidence from animal trials in the testing of
thalidomide provided grounds for an estimation of low risk to human
subjects; the initial trials in the human fetus resulted in massive
teratogenic effects.
I would therefore urge review boards to exercise caution in the
interpretation of "risk" and to avoid the temptation to consider the
risks "minimal" when in fact they cannot be fully assessed.
Second, I think it important to emphasize the evaluative nature of
judgments of risk. The term "risk" means chance of harm. Interpretation of risk involves both an assessment of statistical chance of injury
and an assessment of the nature of the injury. Value judgments about
what constitutes a "harm" and what percentage chance of harm is acceptable are both involved in the determination of acceptable risk. A small
chance of great harm may be considered unacceptable where a greater
chance of a smaller harm would be acceptable. For example, it is comt Assistant Professor of Christian Ethics, Pacific School of Religion.
t Adjunct Associate Professor of Bioethics, University of California at San
Francisco.
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monly accepted that a 1-2 percent chance of having a child with Down's
syndrome is a "high" risk, where the same chance of minor infection
from amniocentesis would be considered a "low" risk. Opinions will
differ both about what constitutes "harm" or injury and also about
what chance of a particular harm is acceptable.
For all these reasons, the interpretation of risk and the designation
of acceptable "minimal risk" merit considerable attention by the scientific community and the lay public,. The provision of national review
in problematic instances should engender serious deliberation on these
critical issues.
Third, the establishment of criteria for "no risk" or "minimal risk"
is obviously related to the interpretation of "harm." In general, the
Commission has discussed "harm" in terms of two indices: (1) injury
or diminished faculty, and (2) pain. A third commonly accepted definition of "harm" is "offense against right or morality"; this meaning of
harm has been subsumed under the rubric of violation of dignity or
integrity of the fetus, and thus is separated out of the Commission's
deliberations on acceptable levels of risk. In establishing acceptable
levels of risk, therefore, the Commission has been concerned with injury
and pain to the fetus.
Several ethicists argued cogently before the Commission that the
ability to experience pain is morally relevant to decisions regarding
research. Indeed, the argument was advanced that the ability to experience pain is a more appropriate consideration than is viability for purposes of establishing the limits of intervention into fetal life.
However, scientific opinion is divided on the question of whether
the fetus can experience pain - and on the appropriate indices on which
to measure the experience of pain. Several experts argue that the fetus
does not feel pain.
I believe that the Commission has implicitly accepted this view in
making Recommendation (6) regarding research on the fetus during
the abortion procedure and on the nonviable fetus ex utero. Should
this view not be correct, and should the fetus indeed be able to experience pain before the twentieth week of gestation, I would modify Recommendation (6) in two ways:
First, the Recommendation as it now stands does not specify an
acceptable level of risk. The reason for this omission is essentially as
follows: in a dying subject prior to viability, "diminution of faculties"
does not appear to be a meaningful index of harm since this index
refers largely to future life expectations. Therefore, the critical meaning
of "harm" for such a subject lies in the possibility of experiencing pain.
If the fetus does not feel pain it cannot be "harmed" in this sense, and
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thus there is no risk of harm for such a fetus. It is for this reason that
the Commission has not specified an acceptable level of "risk" for fetuses
in this category, although it has been careful to protect the dignity of
the fetus.
Clearly, however, if the fetus does indeed feel pain, then it can be
"harmed" by the above definition of harm. If so, then I would argue
that an acceptable level of risk should be established at the same level
as that considered acceptable for fetuses in utero - namely, "no risk"
or "minimal risk."
Second, the Commission has concluded that out of respect for the
dying subject, no interventions are permissible which would alter the
duration of life of the subject - i.e., by shortening or lengthening the
dying process (item h). I find the prohibition against shortening the
life of the dying fetus to be acceptable provided the fetus does not feel
pain. If the fetus does feel pain, however, then its dying may be painful
and respect for the dying subject may require that its pain be minimized
even if its life-span is shortened in so doing.
2. The Commission has stated that its provisions regarding therapeutic and nontherapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman
are not intended to limit research on improving abortion techniques. I
support this stand and wish to clarify the reasons for my support.
In supporting this statement, I neither condone nor encourage
widespread abortion. However, I do believe that some abortions are
both legally and morally justifiable. It is therefore consonant with the
principle of minimizing harm to develop techniques of abortion that are
least harmful. Indeed, under the present climate of legal freedom to
abort and widespread practice of abortion, adherence to the principle
of not-harming may impose an obligation on us to research abortion
technology in order to -minimize harm. This obligation arises not only
out of consideration of -thehealth and well-being of the woman but also
from a concern for possible pain or discomfort of the fetus during the
abortion procedure.
3. Evidence presented to the Commission indicates that there is
a strong emphasis in the law on avoiding possible injury to a child to
be born. This evidence, coupled with the uncertainty of risks in a new
class of human subjects, suggests that considerable importance ought
to be attached to the question of compensation for injury incurred
during research.
The Commission will study this question in depth at a later time,
and therefore has not made any recommendations on compensation at
this time. As a matter of personal opinion, I would like to note that I
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am reluctant to allow any research on the living human fetus unless
provision has been made for adequate compensation of subjects injured
during research.
4. The Commission's Recommendation on research during the
abortion procedure and on the nonviable fetus ex utero prevents prolongation of the dying process for purposes of research. This prohibition
may appear to have the effect of preventing research on the development
of an artificial placenta.
It is my understanding that such an effect does not necessarily
follow. Steps toward the development of an artificial placenta are prohibited only through nontherapeutic research; innovative therapy or
therapeutic research on the possibly viable infant is not only condoned
but encouraged. Thus the development of an artificial placenta may
proceed, but under more restricted circumstances in which it is limited
to therapeutic research or to nontherapeutic research which does not
alter the duration of life. I do not believe that it was the intention of
the Commission to curtail all research toward the development of an
artificial placenta, nor do I believe that such will be the effect of the
Commission's Recommendations.
Were the Recommendations to have such an effect, however, I
would dissent. Indeed, I would argue that a prematurely delivered fetus
that is unable to survive, given the support of available medical technology, would have an interest in the development of an artificial
placenta that would allow others like it to survive. Thus it would not
be contrary to the interests of that fetus for it to be subjected to nontherapeutic research in the development of an artificial placenta.
In making such an argument, I invoke a principle that I call the
"principle of proximity": namely, that research is ethically more acceptable the more closely it approximates what the considered interests
of the subject would reasonably be. For example, Hans Jones has
argued that dying subjects should not be used in nontherapeutic research, even when they have consented, unless the research deals directly
with the cause from which they are dying; that is, it is presumed that a
dying subject has an interest in his/her own disease which legitimates
research on that disease where research in general would not be legitimate.
Such a principle is, of course, open to wide interpretation. But I
think it not unreasonable to suggest that the dying fetus would have
an interest in the cause of its dying or in the development of technology
which would allow others like it to survive. On such a principle, one
might argue that it is more ethically acceptable to use dying fetuses
with Tay-Sachs disease as subjects in nontherapeutic research on Tay-
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Sachs disease than in nontherapeutic research on general fetal pharmacology. Similarly, one might argue that it is ethically acceptable to use
nonviable fetuses ex utero as subjects in nontherapeutic research on
the development of an artificial placenta. The development of a full
rationale for such a position would require an analysis along the lines
suggested by McCormick and Toulmin, and I cannot attempt that here.
At this point I simply wish to suggest that I believe it is possible to
argue for both therapeutic and nontherapeutic research directed toward
the development of artificial placenta.
5. Finally, members of the Commission disagreed about changes
in the timing or method of abortion in relation to research. Recommendation (10) states clearly that the recommendations of a physician
regarding timing and method of abortion should not be determined by
the design or conduct of nontherapeutic research. I am in full agreement
with this Recommendation.
The provision in Recommendation (6) (item g), however, is more
ambiguous. I would argue that changes in timing or method of abortion
are ethically acceptable provided that they are freely chosen by the
woman and that she has been fully informed of all possible risks from
such changes. I base this argument on the right of any patient to be
informed about alternative courses of treatment and to choose between
them. It seems to me that the pregnant woman, as a patient, may choose
the timing and method of abortion, provided that she has been fully
informed of the following: 1) the relation of alternative methods of
abortion to possible research on the fetus; 2) risks to herself and to
possible future children of alternative possible methods of abortion; and
3) procedures which would be introduced into the abortion as part
of the research design which would not be medically indicated.
Some members of the Commission have argued that a woman
might choose such changes provided that they entail no additional risk.
While I appreciate the concern to protect the woman's health and wellbeing, such a restriction seems to me a violation of her right to freedom
of choice as a patient. Thus I would allow a woman to choose to delay
her abortion until the second trimester for purposes of research, provided that she has been fully informed of all risks in so doing. One
restriction seems imperative to me, however: in no case, would she be
allowed to delay the abortion beyond the twentieth week of gestation
for research purposes. This position is reflected in the Deliberations
and Conclusions of the Commission's Report.
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